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22 JUN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel
ATTENTION : Scott Breckenridge
SUBJECT : HSCA Request
REFERENCE : HSCA Letter Dated 8 May 78, OLC 78-1573

1. (U) Reference requests access to information in six areas pertaining to the U-2 Project. As you know the U-2 Project files include about 150 boxes and over 650 reels of microfilm, all located at the Records Center. We have reviewed the shelf listing titles to identify pertinent files that might be responsive to the areas of request. The information requested covers an era and an organization which was not a part of this Directorate. As a result much of the corporate memory is no longer available and research of the files by current personnel is time consuming and requires almost a learning process. We have depended a great deal on the written History of the U-2 Project for leads to files and for information contained in this memorandum.

2. (U) The primary interest of reference refers to the U-2 Project, Detachment C, while stationed in Atsugi, Japan. Attached are replies keyed to the six areas in the HSCA letter.

3. (U) We realize that the information supplied by this memorandum does not fully respond to all the areas requested. Because of the broad and encompassing nature of some of the requests in the HSCA letter and the fact that our files are not organized to readily respond to such broad requests we request that the HSCA staff review the material and determine if their requests could be limited or narrowed in some way.

Thomas G. Ward, Jr.

Thomas G. Ward
Acting Executive Officer
Directorate of
Science and Technology

Attachments:
As stated

May be downgraded to
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CL BY: 469804

Attachment To:
SC-01836-78SUBJECT: DDS&T Interim Reply to HSCA Request, 8 May 78,
OLC 78-1573

General Background: Detachment C advance party of security and communication personnel departed the U.S. for Atsugi, Japan, on 20 February 1957, the second echelon of administrative personnel departed 4 March, and the main body of the detachment with two U-2 aircraft and equipment began deployment on 15 March. On 29 March Headquarters was notified that all personnel and equipment were on base. Operational readiness was forecast for the week of 8 April. Operating procedures and liaison had been accomplished with the following major U.S. components:

Far East Air Force 13-3
Far East Command and Theater Commander
Agency's (Tokyo Station) and local support unit
54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron
Atsugi Naval Air Station

Details or specific operating agreements or procedures with the above components have not been located.

By mid-May 1957 the Detachment had flown 30 sorties. All of these operations were preparations for the primary mission of the Detachment. The first primary mission of the Detachment, a flight over part of the USSR, occurred on 20 June 1957, however, this mission did not originate or recover at Atsugi.

The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi occurred on 1 March 1958 and this flight was the only and last flight. This flight, as other previous flights by other Detachments, was tracked by Russian radar, even though the U-2 aircraft had anti-radar applications, and a Soviet protest was made on 5 March 1958 by the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Mikhail Menshikov. Attached are copies of the Soviet Aide Memoires of 5 March and 21 April 1958 (Tab A).

The Detachment continued to perform non-USSR missions in the Far East area until the Powers flight of 1 May 1960. Redeployment of the Detachment began in early July, the last U-2 aircraft departed Japan on 9 July and all personnel and other equipment cleared the base and turned the facilities back to the Navy on 19 August 1960.

During the deployment of Detachment C it performed approximately 86 operational missions, of these only 43 originated and recovered at Atsugi.

1. Any and all information pertaining to the take-offs and landings of the U-2 at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

We have been unable to locate files which would contain logs of all take-offs and landings of the U-2 aircraft assigned to Detachment C. In addition to the mission flights stated above we must assume that there were a large number of take-offs and landings which would include flights for pilot familiarization, training, equipment testing, transitional and flights (purely for cover purposes.) 32

2. Any and all information concerning the radar procedures, facilities, and staff involved with the U-2 flights at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

As stated in the General Background above we have not located details or specific operating procedures or agreements with the local Navy base at Atsugi.

3. Any and all information pertaining to contact between Marine Air Control Squadron #1, Air Group II, 1st Marine Wing, and U-2 personnel at Atsugi, Japan, including but not limited to housing, recreational, and eating facilities - limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

We have not identified any relationship between Detachment C and Marine Air Control Squadron #1. On the subject of housing, we have noted that late in 1957 families were permitted at Detachment C and as a result housing was provided in the compound assigned to the Agency Support Unit and ten houses were rented on the local market.

4. Any and all information pertaining to defectors with knowledge of the U-2 program.

The DDS&T has not located any information pertaining to defectors. We defer this request to the DDO.

4/12

5. Any and all information within the U-2 program file pertaining to defectors with knowledge of the U-2 program.

See above.

6. Any and all information concerning Soviet knowledge of the U-2 program previous to May 1, 1960.

Attached is an extract from a report dated 3 March 1958 concerning Soviet Air Defense which gives a summary of Soviet knowledge of the U-2 overflights between 20 June and 10 July 1956 (Tab B).

Also attached is a copy of the Soviet protest note of 10 July 1956 concerning Mission 2013 on 4 July 1956 which was the first penetration of the Soviet borders (Tab C).

5 March 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

AIDE MEMOIRE

According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter, the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan in the area south of the Olga Bay.

The information on this violation has been carefully checked and there is no doubt as to its authenticity. The military representatives of the United States, who in this case acted possibly without the knowledge of the Government of the United States, will perhaps deny the said violation, as has happened in the past. However, such a denial cannot eliminate the fact of violation itself. In any case, the Soviet side would have no interest in commenting on this incident if it had not actually taken place.

At the present time, when negotiations are being conducted on the holding of a summit meeting which could contribute to an improvement of relations and to strengthening trust between states, the violation of the Soviet border by an American military aircraft may be evaluated as an attempt to undermine the efforts aimed at convening such a meeting and to aggravate the international situation.

From the messages of the President of the USA and his conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, as well as from statements by other government officials of the USA, it is known to the Soviet Government that the Government of the USA desires a rapprochement between our governments and improvement in the relations between them. There can hardly be any doubt that such facts of violation of the borders of the USSR can have only one result--that of hindering this cause and upsetting Soviet-American relations.

14-00000

The attention of the Government of the USA is invited to the fact that in the present situation the violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft takes on a particularly dangerous character since, as has been repeatedly reported, American military planes make flights around the clock over many countries of the world carrying thermonuclear bombs. The Government of the USA cannot fail to be aware of what genuinely catastrophic consequences for the cause of peace will ensue when an American plane with such a load will find itself shot down.

The attention of the Government of the USA has already been previously directed to cases of violation of the state boundaries of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft. However, as proven by the case cited, the authorities of the USA have not taken the necessary measures to prevent such violations.

It is absolutely obvious that it is the duty of the governments of the USSR and the USA to do everything possible to prevent any acts capable of complicating the situation and the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA.

The Soviet Government cannot but protest against the violations of Soviet frontiers by an American military aircraft and it expects that the Government of the United States will punish severely those guilty of the violation of the airspace of the USSR which has taken place and that it will take steps to prevent such violations in the future.

Taking into account the present situation, where a summit conference is being prepared, and also the spirit and purpose of the negotiations being conducted between our governments, the Soviet Government would not like to make this matter public or subject it to discussion in the UN.

The hope is expressed that this matter will be settled satisfactorily between the governments of the USSR and the USA and that there will be no need for the Soviet Government to resort to other means for its settlement.

(Initialled by M. Menshikov)

Washington, March 5, 1958

21 April 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Note No. 9

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, referring to the Aide-Memoire of the Department of State dated March 31, 1958 and containing a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the Aide-Memoire of the Soviet Government dated March 5 concerning a violation of the Soviet state border in the Far East by an American military jet aircraft, has the honor to communicate the following:

In the reply Aide-Memoire of the Department of State an attempt is made to deny the fact of an American military aircraft having violated the Soviet border.

As has already been communicated, the Soviet Government has at its disposal carefully verified data on this violation, the reliability of which leaves no room for doubt. According to these data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 a.m. Moscow time, an American military reconnaissance aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement Velikaya Kema, 32 kilometers south of that settlement. Then the violating aircraft deeply penetrated the airspace of the USSR and, after remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time, passed beyond the limits of the Soviet territory 45 kilometers south of the Olga Bay at 8:11 a.m.

In the light of the established facts the reply of the Government of the United States of America can in no way be recognized as satisfactory. Naturally, the question arises as to how to explain such a reply of the American Government: whether it was misled deliberately by its military representatives in the Far East or whether it considered it possible to protect such persons subordinate to it, who, without regard to the possible consequences, sanction violation of Soviet borders, thus creating a threat of international complications.

Such a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the communication of the Soviet Government cannot fail to cause serious concern, the more so since the new case of violation of Soviet airspace took place after warnings on the part of the Government of the USSR to the effect that American authorities should take the necessary steps to prevent such violations.

In connection with the foregoing the Soviet Government expects that the Government of the United States of America will undertake further investigation of this act of violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft and will punish severely those guilty of this violation.

The Soviet Government also expects that the Government of the United States of America will take the necessary steps to prevent violations of Soviet airspace by American aircraft in the future and states that in the event of new violations full responsibility for their consequences will rest with the Government of the United States.

Washington, D. C. . April 1958



SC-02164-58

Summary of Initial Missions

In the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense system was subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven occurring within a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that 24 (COMINT) provides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet system. This is important because it is clear from [redacted]

[redacted] However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:

1. In spite of the fact that these missions come as a surprise, none of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their radar coverage extends above [redacted] feet.

SC-02164-58

2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action. One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which is believed related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft into East Germany and Poland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved into Hungary at about this time.

3. The performance of the Soviet system on the 5 July mission, 2014, was indeed curious. While the action evident from (COMINT) 24 is not clear an explanation which appears to fit the known facts is offered as follows: As a result of the previous missions, the Soviets had concluded the essential facts concerning the missions. 24 i.e., that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew above [] feet, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow was possible. They probably surmised that the 5 July mission was headed for Moscow when the track appeared on a northeasterly heading. The loss of the target when it entered Soviet territory was probably deliberate and the "red herring" track returning to the west was either a dodge or a convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for all the system to see that a "hostile or intruder" was coming over Moscow with no means available to stop it. This idea is supported by the use of a raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point where the track had been "lost". In addition, the track was not labeled "hostile or intruder" when it was broadcast after it had passed beyond Moscow. The reporting of the track when it did appear was only by Moscow and it has been suggested that other stations had been instructed not to broadcast the track. Further, it may or may not be a coincidence that the height broadcast was almost exactly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but on the next missions, four days later, the altitude reporting was consistently above [] feet. 99

4. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recognition of the great height of the mission flights, tracking was better and in general the performance of the warning system was much improved.

5. The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning system closed a 3000 mile track with only two short periods of confusion or track loss. Altitude reporting was over [] feet with one plot passed [] which was only 100 feet off target. 99

6. The first eight missions proved that the air defense warning system is deployed in depth. This was evident from both the continuity of track and most forcefully from the ELINT data collected. Some intercepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 mc/s band were obtained by project ELINT as follows: [] Other 30. These numbers cannot be equated to individual radar sets since the same radar may be intercepted more than once. [] were located, including [] new sites. Some additional [] signals were identified but available information does not permit determination of location so that it must be concluded that these signals include both known and new sites. Because of the limitation of ELINT to the [] band and the Soviet practice of collocating radars on different frequencies the total number of radars may be expected to be at least double the number of sites. 49

SC-02164-58

7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point has not been determined because of insufficient data.

8. The question of radars for height finding, the capabilities of [] in this role, the introduction of ROCK CAKES and later developments are discussed in another section. It is believed, however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction of ROCK CAKES.

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(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

10 July 1956

Note No. 23

The Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, acting on instructions from the Soviet Government, has the honor to state the following:

According to precisely verified data, on July 4 of this year, at 8:18 a.m. Moscow Time, a twin-engined medium bomber of the United States Air Force appeared from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany and flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, entering the air space of the Soviet Union from the direction of the Polish People's Republic at 9:35 in the area of Grodno. The aircraft which violated the air space of the Soviet Union flew on the route Minsk, Vilnyus, Kaunas and Kaliningrad, penetrating territory of the Soviet Union to the depth of 320 kilometers and remaining over such territory for one hour and 32 minutes.

On July 5 of this year, at 7:41 Moscow Time, a twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force, coming from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany, flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and at 8:54 penetrated the air space of the Soviet Union in the area of Brest, coming from the direction of the Polish People's Republic. The aircraft violating the air frontier of the Soviet Union flew along the route Brest, Pinsk Baranovich, Kaunas, and Kaliningrad, having penetrated Soviet territory to a depth of 150 kilometers and having remained one hour and 20 minutes over such territory. The same day another twin-engine bomber of the United States Air Force

Department of State of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.

invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and penetrated to a significant depth over Soviet territory.

On July 9 there took place new flights of United States aircraft into the Soviet air space.

The above-mentioned violation of the air frontiers of the Soviet Union by American aircraft cannot be interpreted as other than intentional and conducted for purposes of reconnaissance.

It must be underscored that these gross violations of the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of international tensions has been achieved, when relations between governments are improving, and when mutual confidence between them is growing. Such a development of international relations is fully supported by the peoples of all countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.

One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of countries are worried by the relaxation of international tension which has taken place. These circles do everything possible to interfere with further improvement of relations between countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union, which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government energetically protests to the Government of the United States against such gross violation of the air space of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft and considers this violation as an intentional act of certain circles in the United States, planned to aggravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

14-00000

Calling the attention of the Government of the United States to the inadmissibility of such violations of the air space of the Soviet Union by American aircraft, the Soviet Government states that all responsibility for possible consequences of such violations rests with the Government of the United States.

The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken by the Government of the United States to punish those guilty for the said violations and to prevent such violations in the future.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956